0ne of the greatest nightmares of any pilot or aircrew is to be shot down over enemy territory with the real possibility of imprisonment, torture, or being used for propaganda purposes. History has proven again and again that once captured by the enemy, an aircrew member was likely to be treated very badly with the Geneva Convention seldom taken into consideration, the knowledge of this obviously having a very negative effect on the moral. Another aspect is the crew’s actual loss, one can replace an aircraft relatively easy, but not a trained and experienced crew member. This was the experience of the German Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain in 1940, while most Luftwaffe pilots shot down over England inevitably became POW’s, Goering’s Luftwaffe was not prepared for such losses in manpower. Germany could make up for material losses quite easily, however the Luftwaffe never fully recovered from the loss of its personnel. The allied forces had a similar problem and even though they had substantially greater resources, losses in air battles over the German Reich from 1943/44 gutted allied air forces.

If a pilot of the Second World War could not save his damaged aircraft over friendly territory and was fortunate enough to bail out successfully then generally he would become a Prisoner of War (POW) until the end of hostilities, regardless of his physical condition. Escape was successful to only a few if at all, and then only with the help of the local resistance. At that time, the rescue of pilots or aircrew brought down in enemy territory was all but impossible. Technology helped change this especially with the advent of the helicopter. During the Korean War pilots of the U S Air Force were equipped with walkie-talkies and could communicate with rescue units advising them of their position and situation. The actual voice transmitting range of these radios and the physical range of the rescue helicopters themselves was at the time still very much limited, so rescue attempts were fairly restricted to the forward edge of the battle area. With success of these dangerous missions depending more on luck that any elaborate plan. Nevertheless, no less than 254 pilots and crew members were rescued during this conflict!

The Viet-Nam war brought about substantial advances in this area. On one hand more modern systems were available (apart from more efficient transport helicopters), however it was above all the advent of the heavily armed combat helicopter that provided a means of securing the rescue area, adding to the overall success of the mission. On the other hand, losses incurred by the American forces were still very high. But at least aircrews now knew that if they were shot down over enemy territory, not all hope was lost. The knowledge of this alone raised the moral of these crews considerably. However rescue attempts were still limited to within close proximity of the front lines. If a pilot or crew had to bail out of their B-52 in the far north of Viet-Nam, he or they held a firm reservation at the Hanoi Hilton. Naturally the dangers presented to the rescue team themselves can not be understated. The loss rate among Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) teams in Viet-Nam was relatively high, therefore alternative rescue methods were to be developed. While in Viet-Nam more than two thirds of all downed pilots were rescued, the odds of a successful rescue in the first Gulf War went down dramatically for allied/coalition aircrews. One of the secrets of a successful rescue mission in Viet-Nam was the speed in which the rescue mission was executed with most of the crews actually being rescued within 2 hours. Such a procedure can be very complex (rescue teams must be constantly be at a high stated of readiness close to the frontline), but nevertheless very effective, giving the enemy little time to react while accomplishing their rescue mission. In the Gulf War of the six pilots shot down, only one was rescued, although not one rescue mission was accomplished within the magic 2 hour timeframe. With the very fast advance of the coalition ground forces, a downed pilot had to rely on his ability to keep himself hidden long enough to be rescued by the advancing coalition forces.

Due to previous experience in the Gulf War, the air forces of the USA, France and Great Britain formed and/or improved their existing CSAR units with one of the first successful missions taking place in the Balkans.
On 27 March 1999 at around 20:45 hours a message was received at the control centre for NATO air operations in Vincenca Italy that a F-117A had been shot down over Yugoslav territory. One hour later an AWAC aircraft located the pilot some 30 miles northeast from Belgrade resulting in an extensive combined rescue mission being launched. As always, it was a race against time as the opposing ground forces tried franticly to get to the downed pilot first. At about 02:30h the pilot was successfully recovered by helicopters right in the middle of enemy territory and safely delivered to a secure area. Details of the units involved in that mission are still classified as top secret as CSAR missions are subject to the highest security classification and for good reason. Not only are helicopters sent in to an enemy country to pick up a downed pilot, but CSAR missions are amongst the most sophisticated and most complex commando operations undertaken by an army. Apart from troop carrying helicopters, special commandos are inserted by combat helicopter(s) to secure the rescue area while combat aircraft provide air cover and if required close air support for the rescue force. This ensures that the mission is accomplished as safely as possible for all involved (with exception of the enemy perhaps) leaving the enemy with little or no time to react. In the past such a rescue mission would involve only a few helicopter crews, perhaps even saving one of their own, today such a mission would involve some one hundred personnel.

Apart from the previously mentioned nations of the USA, France and Great Britain, there is almost no other NATO county that possess CSAR teams with experience in this kind of operation. International security and ever more frequent international missions require that other NATO countries become more active in this area. The USA or Great Britain may not always be available to carry out this role, therefore the German Federal Armed Forces and other NATO states have undertaken then initiative to establish and train their own CSAR units. However, not yet mentioned and of particular importance is the CSAR training of the pilots and aircrew as the correct course of action in any emergency must be practiced by all parties involved.
Therefore, Tiger Meet was also the venue for a multinational CSAR exercise involving a very interesting combination of German ground troops being flown in Czech Mil Mi-24V helicopters of the No 231 Sqn from Prerov, all escorted and led into the target area by MBB Bo-105 of the army aviation company 7 from Celle. The heavily armed HIND provided also necessary fire support in the fictitious enemy area.

Robert Kysela / manging editor